What is happening in South Africa?

The situation mirrors the frustration among the vast majority of poor black South Africans. They assume that local jobs which are exclusively theirs are being “stolen” by illegal and cheap labour mostly from Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Swaziland, and Ethiopia.

South Africa, the rainbow nation, recently experienced troubling times, described as xenophobia. Just before mid-May, violence erupted in some of the townships around Johannesburg when sections of black people attacked other blacks. Very quickly, the violence escalated and by end May, about 100,000 people were displaced, hundreds badly beaten and close to 60 died. For the first time since the end of the apartheid in 1994, the Army had to be called in to assist the police in restoring order.

Most of the affected were immigrants from Zimbabwe, some from Mozambique, Malawi, Ethiopia, Swaziland, Lesotho and even Nigeria. There was extensive loss of property which the immigrants had acquired over years of hard work and often constituted the savings of a lifetime. The media were critical of the handling of the post-violence situation by the security personnel. The victims could not complain as most of them were undocumented residents in South Africa. Calling it “destructive divisiveness,” former President Nelson Mandela reminded his people of the timely help extended by South Africa’s neighbours during the apartheid regime’s excesses. Nobel Laureate Bishop Tutu also urged his countrymen to refrain from violence as all Africans are their brothers’ keepers, especially in difficult times.

However, the situation mirrors the frustration among the vast majority of poor black South Africans. They assume that local jobs which are exclusively theirs are being “stolen” by illegal and cheap labour mostly from Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Swaziland, and Ethiopia. They are unwilling to accept that migration of labour from the rest of Africa into South Africa is due to slow growth in total employment in the rest of Africa in the last decade. Herein lay the explanation for the xenophobia. In fact, as early as 1997, the South African Human Rights Commission had identified massive migration into South Africa as a major cause for xenophobia with consequences for democracy and human security.

On paper, there is amity among the multi-racial, multi-cultural people of South Africa, reinforced largely by the charismatic Nelson Mandela. Several measures were instituted to integrate all sections of society. Most important of these was the Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) programme as the best and sustainable approach to the development of the country. The BEE has been a signature programme which emphasises that the financial services industry be expanded to include the black majority. It entails not merely their participation in development and management of skills but also in the transfer of ownership. This has resulted in the emergence of a new booming black middle class referred to as “black diamonds” who often flaunt their status.

Then there are the outsiders, often referred to as “foreigners,” who have successfully made South Africa their abode taking advantage of the high pace of its growth. The country is the wealthiest in the 14-member Southern African Development Community. South Africa’s mineral wealth has given handsome financial returns while agriculture’s performance has been fairly good and physical infrastructure largely in place. GDP per head according to the IMF in South Africa is $3827, the highest in Sub-Saharan Africa. Growth has averaged over five per cent in the last three years.

Competing for scarce resources

It has been South Africa’s ability to do well as compared to the rest of Africa that has served as a magnet for attracting two categories of outsiders to migrate to its cities and peri-urban areas: they are the highly skilled and well trained professionals and the not-so-skilled. The latter, however, are often enterprising, willing to take risks and are prepared to invest small capital in small and medium business ventures such as taxi services and convenience or corner stores where locals are employed. Foreigners also work, often on abysmal wages as miners, farmers, construction workers and household help. Over time, they have been competing with the locals for scarce resources such as housing in the informal settlements, access to primary healthcare and education facilities.

What really triggered the recent violence according to most observers is the fact that most of the houses earmarked especially for South Africa’s disadvantaged under the Reconstruction and Development Programme have been purchased by these “foreigners,” often using unfair means.

Unfortunately for South Africa, the number of poor black South Africans with little or no education, no skills, and no access to capital who were unable to take advantage of the opportunities of an expanding economy has swelled rapidly. Forty per cent of South Africans, according to the Congress of South African Trade Unions, are unemployed. Economic reforms of the post-apartheid years have failed to spread the available gains more evenly. Twenty per cent of South Africa’s population remains illiterate even today.

Life has become tougher for the poor South African black especially now with the escalating food and fuel prices. This acted as a trigger. What the marginalised and frustrated sections of South Africans want immediately are security in terms of jobs, housing, healthcare, affordable education and public transport. They too want to enjoy the fruits of democracy. As Winnie Mandela put it so aptly — the problem in South Africa is “not xenophobia, but a reflection of the conditions in which people live that is very conducive to violence.” In such a situation, outsiders are seen more as intruders and not victims. And clashes could flare up any time. There has also been a phenomenal increase in crimes. Visitors to the main cities of South Africa are therefore warned to be careful and not to venture out once it is dusk even as affluent South Africans themselves live behind barbed wires.

At another level, inter-country migration has taken place with the move of the skilled and better placed South Africans to the developed world in their search for greener pastures — positions which are now being filled by well-trained personnel from within Southern Africa, especially Zimbabwe. Most Zimbabweans move as the Zimbabwean economy is a shambles given the massive and rising inflation, loss of jobs in the manufacturing sector, and failed agriculture owing to the unsound policies of Robert Mugabe.

Fifty per cent of the people seeking work permits in South Africa in recent times have been Zimbabweans with more education and improved skills. Several of these migrants include civil aviation experts, IT professionals, engineers, chartered accountants, geologists, paramedical and medical personnel and teachers of physics, chemistry and mathematics. It is estimated that approximately one million skilled Zimbabweans have voted with their feet into South Africa. It is worth noting that the Mbeki government has announced that it would be recruiting about 2000 foreign teachers between 2008 and 2010.

As the violence spread, some of the governments have made attempts to re-integrate their citizens within their own country. Malawians were the first to be evacuated from South Africa followed by Mozambique. It has been a very traumatic time for Zimbabweans who, even as they feel unsafe in South Africa, dread to return to Zimbabwe in view of the highly fluid and tense political and a fast deteriorating economic situation. This poses a moral dilemma for the South African policymakers as to whether they should promote reverse migration to Zimbabwe: they have to factor in the growing resentment at home given the adverse effects of continued migration. They have to, at the same time, ensure that the colours of the rainbow nation that has prided in non-violence, truth and reconciliation as guiding features are kept intact. This is a challenge requiring South Africa to actively help resolve the Zimbabwean political impasse through mediation. Otherwise, the cost of maintaining internal social harmony could be very high in the near to medium term.

(The author, a retired academic from the Centre for African Studies, University of Mumbai, lives now in Abuja, Nigeria.)

Judicial impact assessment and timely delivery of justice

Judicial administration in the country is expected to see some welcome changes of far-reaching significance in the near future.

Judicial Impact Assessment (JIA) is a process whereby the government can anticipate the likely cost of implementing a legislation through the courts and help deliver timely justice to litigants. Litigation demand depends on a variety of factors most of which are not factored in the making of laws. This results in the court system being left with little or no extra resources to cope with additional cases generated by new laws. This is the main reason why despite increased disposals every year, courts are still crowded with mounting arrears of cases. Realising this structural imbalance in the system, the Supreme Court in the Salem Advocates’ Association Case (2005) gave a direction to the government to make JIA an essential component of the Financial Memorandum of legislative proposals. The government, in turn, appointed a task force to recommend a methodology and infrastructure for institutionalising JIA in the law-making process. The committee headed by Justice N.J. Rao recently submitted its report to the government which is likely to come before the apex court for appropriate orders in the pending matter before it. In all likelihood judicial administration in the country is expected to see some welcome changes of far-reaching significance in the near future.

Data on court systems

The lack of adequate data on the working of the judicial system, particularly at the level of subordinate courts, has been a serious impediment in planning and management of judicial reforms. We still do not know the exact reasons for delay or the time taken at various stages of judicial proceedings. What is the cost involved in processing different types of cases and how is it to be calculated? What is the optimum capacity of the system and how judicial time is to be apportioned or evaluated? Management of court systems, including budgeting and accountability mechanisms, are outdated. Consequently, in spite of the fact that “Administration of Justice: constitution and organisation of all courts, except the Supreme Court and the High Courts” remained part of Concurrent List since 1976 (Entry 11-A of List III of Seventh Schedule), the Plan investment on Judiciary did not exceed 0.07 per cent of the total Plan outlay! Obviously, the budget making procedures of courts in India, lacked professionalism and scientific inputs supported by appropriate data and reasons. This lacuna in judicial administration is expected to undergo a desirable change once JIA becomes a part of management of court systems in the country. Furthermore, financial independence of the Judicial branch of government will receive some degree of respect in the scheme of constitutional governance.

Given the fact that continuous generation of credible data on court functioning is the foundation for JIA, it is imperative that a mechanism for collection, analysis and reporting of judicial data is put in place at the earliest. The task force recommended the creation of Judicial Impact Offices at the level of the Supreme Court and High Courts under the respective Chief Justices to be managed by an officer of the rank of Secretary to government. Involvement of the Ministries of Home, Law and Finance in the management of JIA offices is proposed on the model of the National Judicial Academy. A manager of Judicial Statistics at the District level is also proposed. Through interaction with economists, statisticians and legal academics, these offices will not only conduct JIA studies but also help in the efficient financial management of court systems. A window for effective judiciary-executive interaction will thus emerge for better administration of justice and improved Centre-State relations in the judicial sphere.

JIA methodology

The key element in JIA is the methodology for estimating judicial workload resulting from new legislations and determining the additional costs involved in Judge-time and support services. The report has recommended multiple methodologies based on two field studies commissioned by it.

One can identify at least three patterns in this regard. First, when legislatures make changes in civil or criminal procedure codes, they impact on litigation. Amendment to Procedure Codes compelling recourse to pre-trial settlements is an example of direct impact on court work. Secondly, if laws are made or amended creating or extinguishing substantive rights, it impacts on the workload of courts. Thus, amendment of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act in 2005 generated 25 lakh additional Criminal cases in different courts in the country. Thirdly, when rights are interpreted narrowly or liberally by High Courts and the Supreme Court in the course of adjudication, it results in less or more litigation. For example, when Fundamental Right under Article 21 of the Constitution was given a liberal interpretation or when the rule of locus standi was expansively interpreted, it led to more litigation and additional workload in the Constitutional Courts.

In short, workload in courts is the result of multiple factors, some depending on litigants dispositions and other based on legislative and adjudicative actions. To be able to evolve credible, standardised methodologies to estimate the impact of legislation on court workload, it is necessary to have input-output details of court production-delivery systems. Laws need to be classified on identifiable attributes and on the average time it takes through different court procedures. Systematic national legal surveys (similar to health surveys) can give some indication of litigation demand and consequent court workload variations. Similarly, experimental study on litigant response to draft legislation before its introduction in Parliament can also assess litigation demand among the concerned public.

Both these methods, though tentative, can indicate the volume of litigation demand statistically. However, a better method is to employ empirical data on court systems and court productivity and, through regression analysis, seek correlations at specified significant levels in order to estimate the workload.

Demand for litigation is explained through economic assumptions of human behaviour. The filing of complaints under a given law depends on the cost of doing so, its estimated value and the opportunity costs involved in its being decided, given the delay in litigation. Predictions are made on such a litigation model keeping note of other possible variables.

Central funding

“Over 90 per cent of litigation is processed in the subordinate courts which are set up and managed by the States. They handle both Central and State Acts. Parliamentary legislation adds to the burden of State courts. In the context of Entry 11-A of List III of Seventh Schedule (Administration of Justice) and Article 247 providing for establishment of additional courts for laws made by Parliament, it is the Constitutional obligation of the Central government to finance judicial costs involved in implementing Central laws. It is impermissible to avoid this obligation by pretending that executive powers of the Union government do not allow establishing courts in States. Article 73 does not come in the way of funding subordinate courts in States for implementing Central laws. JIA demands that the Union government shall not make any law without providing adequate budgeting support to States for implementing Central laws whether made on subjects in List I or List III. This is the only way to ensure timely justice to millions of litigants who increasingly seek justice through courts.

(The author is a former Director of the National Judicial Academy and Member of the Task Force on Judicial Impact Assessment.)

Resilience at work

In a recent report, Global Development Finance 2008, the World Bank examines the impact of the U.S. financial crisis on developing countries. While the global economy slowed down, developing countries have come out relatively unscathed. The world economy is expected to grow at 2.7 per cent, down from the 3.7 per cent registered in 2007. GDP growth in high income countries is forecast at 1.6 per cent, which is one percentage point below what was achieved in 2007. However, growth in China, the rest of East Asia and the Pacific, and other developing regions will be an impressive 6.5 per cent during the current year (compared with 7.8 per cent in 2007). In the World Bank’s view, the economies of both India and China will slow down but still grow at very respectable rates. China, which posted double-digit GDP growth for the fifth time in succession last year, is forecast to grow at 9.7 per cent. India will see a sharper deceleration from 8.7 per cent to 7 per cent in 2008. While being lower than the forecasts made by several official Indian agencies, this figure will be above the average for developing countries. In what is seen as a demonstration of the resilience of developing nations, a record $1 trillion of net private capital flowed to them in 2007.

In the light of this experience and taking into account other factors, the World Bank concludes that developing countries are not victims, and that in many respects they determine the trends in the global economy. Better macroeconomic policies, higher levels of investment, and wider application of technology have helped these countries. In fact, domestic demand and increasing imports have to a large extent cushioned the impact of the global downturn on the developing economies. More than half of the global import demand now originates from developing countries. However, the developing world has been hit the most by inflation arising from the global phenomenon of high energy and food prices. The problem is exacerbated by the unwinding of global imbalances and the unsustainable situation of high current account and fiscal deficits in the U.S being financed by the savings of developing countries. International banking, a focus area in the World Bank report, has won a fair amount of praise. It has enhanced competition and efficiency and widened the scope of the credit markets. On the downside, it has transmitted the shocks from developed markets and reduced credit availability to the developing countries. For policy-makers, the present economic environment presents challenges of great complexity.

A great soldier fades away

“One who excels at employing the army,” wrote Sun Tzu in the sixth-century classic, The Art of War, “leads them by the hand as if they were only one man.” Field Marshal Sam Hormusji Framji Jamshedji Manekshaw, who passed away Friday at Wellington at the age of 94, will be remembered for his exceptional demonstration of this skill during the Indian Army’s historic, nation-creating victory at Dhaka in 1971. He will also be remembered for representing the finest traditions of the Indian Army: professionalism, discipline, and an unwavering commitment to the core values of democracy. Sam Manekshaw was born in Amritsar to Parsi parents in 1914, and his adult life was entwined with the making of the modern Indian Army. He served the British Indian Army against Japanese forces in what is now Myanmar, twice suffering serious combat injuries; helped put down Partition riots; and fought against Pakistani forces from Jammu and Kashmir in 1947-1948. Sidelined in the run-up to the 1962 war with China, Sam Manekshaw was rehabilitated during the subsequent military reconstruction drive. He was elevated as General Officer Commanding-in-Chief of the Eastern Command before the India Pakistan war of 1965. He counselled against offensive operations in what is now Bangladesh, demonstrating a concern for avoiding civilian casualties that paid off six years later. His services in Nagaland as Eastern Army commander were rewarded with a Padma Bhushan in 1968. He was awarded a Padma Vibhushan and, in 1973, elevated to the highest rank a soldier can aspire to. He remains one of just two Generals(Other being K.M.Cariappa) of the Indian Army to have been made a Field Marshal.

Field-Marshal Manekshaw’s military legacy has been the subject of energetic debate in recent years, with some critics arguing that he was not the principal architect of India’s 1971 victory. The official history of the war of 1971 — which for some opaque reason remains a classified document, even though it can now be downloaded from the Internet — suggests that none of the protagonists ever issued an unequivocal order to seize Dhaka. Both Army Headquarters and Eastern Command “had thought of and made some provision for the capture of Dhaka, but had played safe and issued no formal order to any of the formations in the field” — a not-unreasonable position given the prospect of a United States-backed Pakistani counter-offensive. In the event, Lieutenant-General Sagat Singh and Major-General Gandharv Nagra took “the bit in their teeth and gallop[ed] for Dhaka even before receiving any order.” Field-Marshal Manekshaw’s real genius lay in his selection of his field commanders — and his ability to inspire the confidence that, if things went wrong, their commander would stand by them. He refused to condone wrongdoing: on one occasion, he told a subordinate facing credible corruption charges that his choices were to resign or shoot himself. ‘Sam Bahadur,’ as the men of the 8 Gurkha Rifles proudly called him, will be remembered not just for the military triumph he helped achieve — but as an exemplar of military leadership.

A Field Marshal and a gentleman

Through earthiness and plain-speak Sam Manekshaw motivated an army that achieved what no other army has done since the Second World War — liberating a nation.

Field Marshal S.H.F.J. Manekshaw was the quintessential soldier: magnificently mustachioed, charming, dapper, decisive, and above all, impervious to political pressure. He was better known as Sam Bahadur, or Sam the Brave, a title bestowed on him by his beloved Gurkhas. Compared to today’s standards and levels of probity in the Army, he was cool, bold and seminal. And he was considerate to those under his command. His was a highly decorated soldiering career that sp anned four decades.

He was also droll and irreverent, traits long extinct in the Indian military. He was an able listener, irrespective of how junior his interlocutor. He was charismatic, and rarely ever stood on ceremony. Through earthiness and plain-speak he motivated an army that achieved what no other army has done since the Second World War — liberating a nation. Even the U.S., with all its might and technical wizardry, has not managed such a feat in the past 63 years.

The Field Marshal was a team player. He almost always finished his own work in an hour and spent the rest of his time floating from one office to another. He often dropped in on harried juniors, and eagerly helped them with their tasks.

As Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee, Manekshaw’s chutzpah helped achieve ‘jointness’ among the three Services. This was evidenced by the coordinated and synergised operations that resulted in Pakistan’s military rout in 1971. Without doubt India’s finest war-time chief, he was also a noble warrior who looked upon his enemies with respect. Addressing troops from atop the bonnet of his jeep in the Chamb Sector in November 1971 weeks before the 1971 campaign started, he asked them not to be rapacious in victory.

Separately, he urged the officers not to misbehave with Pakistani women. If they were ever overcome with “negative urges,” they should put their hands in their pockets and think of Sam Manekshaw, he added. By and large, the Indian Army behaved in an exemplary manner in both the theatres of war. Having begun with the Second World War in which he was awarded the Military Cross on the battlefield during the Burma campaign, Manekshaw actively participated in all the wars that independent India fought. He capped it all with the decisive 1971 triumph that led to the birth of Bangladesh.

Measured campaign

Manekshaw’s planning of the 1971 campaign was brilliantly measured, and it showed his well-rounded leadership qualities. He steadfastly refused to cave in to pressure from either Prime Minister Indira Gandhi or her Cabinet colleagues to launch immediate military operations against East Pakistan. Their intention was also to stem the flow of millions of Bengali refugees into India after the Pakistan Army had executed a pogrom of intellectuals and leaders, killing over 50,000 of them.

In March 1971, largely Bengali East Pakistan had revolted against the dominance of its Punjabi and Pathan-dominated Western section. This resulted in a brutal crackdown by the army, which had a similar ethnic mix. The refugee exodus into India followed. This imposed on India a crippling financial burden. In addition, the influx strained the social and political fabric in the northeastern States, the effects of which remain till today. After touring the teeming refugee camps, Indira Gandhi asked Manekshaw what the Indian Army could possibly do to control the situation. “Nothing,” quipped Manekshaw, to the horror of the Prime Minister’s entourage of civil servants and Ministers. No one had ever dared to respond so brusquely to her.

An impatient Indira Gandhi, backed by her eager-to-please Cabinet, wanted Manekshaw to conduct a swift, surgical strike on East Pakistan and install a government led by Mujibur Rehman, the popular Bengali leader. This was to be followed by the return of the refugees. Manekshaw patiently listened, and then went on to elaborate firmly on the enormous logistical exercise that was necessary to launch operations against a 90,000-strong Pakistani Army. Guided by military logic, his capability and the reality on the ground, Manekshaw said that though his army would be operationally ready three months later in June, November 1971 would be the tactically opportune point to launch an attack on East Pakistan.

He had principally two reasons for this. The first was that the monsoon would render the region a virtual lake, making troop movement difficult. If India launched operations in June, the outcome would be catastrophic, he said. The second and equally credible rationale for a postponement was a perceived threat from China, with which India had fought a debilitating border war nine years earlier. Manekshaw wanted the Himalayan mountain passes to be snowed up before troops — at least two divisions of them — could be withdrawn from the Chinese front for deployment in the east.

He maintained in his briefing to Indira Gandhi and her Ministers that India must guard against the prospect of having to fight a war on two fronts. “That,” he declared, “would present me with problems far more complex than what had been the bane of the German General Staff for more than 50 years across two World Wars. It would be unwise to rely on diplomatic assurances that the Chinese would not react in support of Pakistan. We must wait for the snow to block the northern passes.”

Indira Gandhi ordered the General to move his formations into position and be ready to engage battle by June. In the ensuing months a whispering campaign was mounted by senior officials and politicians against Manekshaw. He was being accused of cowardice, vacillation and shoddy generalship. Manekshaw was aware of the calumny unleashed against him, but maintained his cool. He went about preparing for combat by bolstering the communication lines around East Pakistan. Indira Gandhi meanwhile secured a friendship and military treaty with the Soviet Union, the country’s principal materiel provider, thereby neutralising the possibility of any interference from either the United States or China. It also enabled the establishment of a formal Bangladesh government-in-exile in India and the arming and training of Mukti Bahini guerilla fighters jointly by the Research and Analysis Wing and Indian Army Special Forces personnel.

Over the next few months, until war started, these guerrillas successfully harassed and engaged the Pakistani Army, confining it to the garrison towns cut off from the capital, Dhaka. This made Manekshaw’s eventual task easier. And, when the Pakistan Air Force conducted a pre-emptive strike on Indian airfields in December 1971 from West Pakistan, Manekshaw unleashed his campaign. It all ended in a fortnight with the liberation of East Pakistan and the capture of over 90,000 Pakistani soldiers.

A firm believer in the chain of command, he delegated the battle planning and execution to Eastern Army field commanders. Meanwhile, he used his clout with the political establishment to meet the financial and hardware requirements. He was the uncrowned Chief of Defence Staff. (This is a post India’s military and political establishment has been wrangling over for the past decade.)

Inimitable modesty

With his inimitable modesty, Manekshaw declined to preside over the Pakistani surrender in Dhaka. He insisted that the credit go to the Eastern Army Commander Lt Gen. Jagjit Aurora. He jocularly remarked that he would go only to accept the surrender of the entire Pakistani Army.

As Chief of the Army Staff, Manekshaw had issued instructions that if anyone from 54 Sikhs came visiting, he was to be escorted straight to him, whatever time it was and whatever he was involved with. Occasionally, these grizzled veterans would arrive at Army House with a string of ‘sifarishs’ (requests) ranging from a bag of sugar for a daughter’s wedding or a note to the local administration for help. All were received with a robust burst of colloquial Punjabi, which Manekshaw spoke like a native. And none was left unrequited.

Deployed to Burma during the Second World War, he was badly wounded during a successful attack near the Sittang river on February 22, 1942 to capture a vital hill while leading two companies. As he charged forward with his men, a Japanese soldier emerged from the jungle and pumped seven bullets into Captain Manekshaw. The Division Commander, Major General D.T. Cowan, who was witness to the action, whipped off his own Military Cross ribbon and pinned it onto Manekshaw. His rationale was that a dead person could not be awarded one of the most coveted bravery medals in the British Army.

After recovering from his wounds, Mankeshaw was once more dispatched to Burma as part of General (later Viscount) Slim’s 14th Army and was wounded again. In the final days of the Second World War, he was appointed Staff Officer to General Daisy in Indochina. There, after the Japanese surrender he helped rehabilitate over 10,000 prisoners of war.

Appointed to the Military Operations Directorate after Independence in 1947, Brigadier Manekshaw was responsible for Planning and Logistics during the first India-Pakistan war over Jammu and Kashmir. He was reportedly the only military officer and one of three people present, albeit in an ante-room, in the palace in Jammu, when Maharaja Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession ceding his kingdom to India in October 1947. The third person was V.P. Menon, who was political adviser to Lord Mountbatten at the time of Partition.

A series of staff and command postings followed. But in 1961 Manekshaw’s outspoken nature offended Defence Minister V.K. Krishna Menon. He favoured Lieutenant-General B.M. Kaul. There was also a court of inquiry into a nebulous charge, but he was exonerated.

India’s 1962 defeat by the Chinese followed, and Manekshaw was swiftly given command by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of the retreating 4 Corps, which was commanded earlier by General Kaul. Manekshaw did wonders to salvage their battered morale. He became Chief of the Army Staff in June 1969 and was made Field Marshal on January 1, 1973. He retired a fortnight later.

Unconventional

He was an unconventional and at times risqué dresser. He once hosted his senior Lieutenant-General, Kulwant Singh, who was commanding the Western Army at Shimla, at an inspection in a “wholly unsuitable” jacket that was a cross between a regulation shirt and a bush shirt. When General Singh referred to it disparagingly, he quipped: “Have you come to inspect my formation or my dress?” Manekshaw invariably supported his subordinate officers, even if they expressed views contrary to his — as long as they were professionally sound. Those who served with him said that he never raised his voice. But even a mild rebuke accompanied by “Sweetheart, this will not do,” was enough to tame the wildest of soldiery egos. Towards some of his peers, however, his attitude was one of disguised mockery.

But Manekshaw’s fabled irreverence got him into trouble with a vindictive Indira Gandhi, who was jealous of his standing after the war. A throwaway line to a news reporter at an airport soon after the 1971 victory that had he decided to migrate to Pakistan at Independence — thousands of Parsis had opted to stay on — India would have lost the war, infuriated Indira Gandhi. She not only castigated him publicly but withdrew some of the perquisites he enjoyed as Field Marshal.

Unlike his successors, Manekshaw faded gracefully into retirement, seeking neither to perpetuate the glory that was justifiably his for personal profit nor compromising his Field Marshal’s Five-Star standing.

'Non-planet' Pluto gets new class

"Plutoid" is the word of the moment for astronomers.

It is the new classification that has been sanctioned for the object that was formerly known as the "ninth planet".

It is nearly two years since the International Astronomical Union (IAU) stripped Pluto of its former status as a "proper" planet.

Now an IAU committee, meeting in Oslo, has suggested that small, nearly spherical objects orbiting beyond Neptune should carry the "plutoid" tag.

As astronomy's official nomenclature organisation, the IAU must approve all new names and classifications.

Its decision at the 2006 General Assembly to demote Pluto from "planet" to "dwarf planet" caused an international furore.

Plutoids or haemorrhoids, whatever they call it. This is irrelevant Alan Stern

Pluto's relegation was felt necessary because new telescope technologies had begun to reveal far-off objects that rivalled the world in size.

Without a new classification, these discoveries raised the prospect that textbooks could soon be talking about 50 or more "planets" in the Solar System.

That prospect proved too much for IAU members who took the historic decision to redefine the Solar System to have just eight major worlds - Mercury, Venus, Earth, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus and Neptune.

They relegated Pluto to a grouping that includes Ceres (the largest asteroid), and Eris, an object slightly larger than Pluto that orbits even further out from the Sun in an icy region known as the Kuiper Belt.

The IAU's Committee on Small Body Nomenclature has now decided that dwarf planets that move beyond Neptune should be placed in a new sub-category, the plutoid.

More plutoids

In a statement released on Tuesday, the IAU further explained the plutoid definition as celestial bodies that "have sufficient mass for their self-gravity to overcome rigid body forces so that they assume a hydrostatic equilibrium (near-spherical) shape, and that have not cleared [their orbits of debris].

"The two known and named plutoids are Pluto and Eris. It is expected that more plutoids will be named as science progresses and new discoveries are made."

The plutoids will also need to have a minimum brightness.

Ceres will not be considered a plutoid because of its position in the asteroid belt between Mars and Jupiter.

The classification will not placate those incensed by Pluto's demotion.

Alan Stern, a former Nasa space sciences chief and principal investigator on a mission to Pluto, was scathing in his condemnation of the IAU.

"It's just some people in a smoke-filled room who dreamed it up," he told the Associated Press. "Plutoids or haemorrhoids, whatever they call it. This is irrelevant."

Patent delays frustrate inventors

The world patent system is under severe stress.

Delays in Europe of up to 10 years have left somewhere between five and ten million inventions globally queuing for approval, according to the head of European Patent Office, Alison Brimelow.

She said the delays were bad for business and created uncertainty for innovators.

There was immense pressure for the reform, she added, with increasing calls for a single European patent - and even a unified global system where a patent granted in one part of the world would be valid everywhere.

Currently, inventors have to file for patents in different countries.

This can be costly, time-consuming and risky.

Backlogs

In Europe there is another layer of complication because innovators can either apply through the European Patent Office or through national patent offices.

A previous attempt to create a unified EU patent stalled, although attempts are being made to revive it.

You cannot pretend the patent system is maintaining its integrity if you are looking at global backlogs Alison Brimelow, European Patent Office

"For many users of the patent system it works along predictable lines, and does what it should," Ms Brimelow says.

Backlogs are, however, a real problem around the world and need to be addressed.

"I am worried," she admits.

"We are going to have to work at some more imaginative solutions than we have in the past. You cannot pretend the patent system is maintaining its integrity if you are looking at global backlogs.

"The Americans say 10 million pending - I say nearer five (million) - but too many. We have to find more effective ways of taking duplication out of the patents system."

She said patents in Europe were supposed to be granted in 36 months but often took four to five years. Some were dragged out for a decade.

Patent experts say sometimes applications are deliberately spun out by firms with a weak invention and a vested interest in keeping the protection of a patent pending without having to put the product fully to the test.

Some developing countries are complaining that the patent system is preventing them obtaining clean technology for the battle against climate change, and are demanding changes to the patent system to fast-track energy-saving inventions.

Mutual recognition?

But Ms Brimelow says the patent system has not been able to respond to such a challenge.

"I note that people I talk to in the business of seeking patents are increasingly happy to speculate on whether the time has come for mutual recognition, a patent examined in one major institution should be recognised by another."

"Simply being able to talk about it changes the shape of dialogue.

"But it is nonetheless very difficult, very sensitive and - because patent offices are good at finding reasons for saying "no" - what is difficult about it is more readily seen than what might be workable.

"For the first time in my involvement in intellectual property since the beginning of the 90s I hear people prepared to talk about this and I think this is a new development and one we have to think about. It needs courageous decision-making."

But there are profound disagreements over what should be deemed patentable between Europe and America on issues like business methods, software and bio-technology.

Language is also a major barrier, with national offices within Europe insisting on businesspeople being able to read patents in their own language.

"In the end political disagreement are real disagreements and in the end you may have to live with the consequences of not agreeing."

Government forms Space Cell

To counter the growing threat to “our space assets”

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India wants to utilise space for peaceful purposes

It will act as a single window for the armed forces

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NEW DELHI: The government on Monday announced the formation of a Space Cell under the Integrated Defence Services Headquarters here to counter “the growing threat to our space assets.”

Justifying the formation of the cell, Defence Minister A. K. Antony said at the United Commanders’ conference that India wanted to utilise space for peaceful purposes and remained committed to non-weaponisation of space. However, “offensive counter space systems like anti-satellite weaponry, new classes of heavy-lift and small boosters and an improved array of military space systems have emerged in our neighbourhood.”

Setting at rest inter-ministerial wrangling over representation, the government said the Space Cell would act as a single window for the armed forces, the Department of Space and the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO).

Defence Informatics Centre

Simultaneously, the government also approved the setting up of a Defence Informatics Centre on the lines of the National Informatics Centre to cater to the e-governance needs of the armed forces, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and other associated organisations. A panel of experts would seek to synergise all IT-related matters in the MoD, the three Services and various organisations.

The two-day conference is focusing on issues pertaining to the ongoing process of “jointness” among the three services, higher defence management and a conceptual way forward. Among those attending the conference are Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee, and Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Sureesh Mehta; Chief of the Air Staff Air Chief Marshal Fali H. Major; Chief of the Army Staff Gen. Deepak Kapoor; Defence Secretary Vijay Singh; Chief of Integrated Service Command H.S. Lidder; and commanders and senior officers from the service headquarters and the MoD.

On the security challenges in and around the country, Mr. Antony said the security situation in Jammu & Kashmir and the North East had improved. “We will have to keep a constant vigil and intensify our efforts to ensure conduct of free and fair elections in an atmosphere of peace,” he said.

Referring to the frequent requests from State governments for the deployment of Army to aid the civil authorities to tackle law and order problems, the Minister said, “This is not a good and healthy development in a democracy.” Requests for the deployment of the armed forces should come from the State governments “only as a last resort when all other options have failed.”

Turning to service conditions in the armed forces, the Minister said the government was alive to the expectations of the services in regard to the Sixth Pay Commission Report. Mr. Antony announced a special grant of Rs. 10.21 crore as compensation for the loss of personal property of 1,021 armed forces personnel during the December 2004 tsunami.

Strictly enforce anti-ragging regulations: Raghavan panel

The Committee was appointed by the Supreme Court

Court had directed that the panel’s report be implemented

NEW DELHI: The Raghavan Committee has asked regulatory bodies to strictly enforce anti-ragging regulations and ensure that educational institutions were no-tolerance campuses in respect of ragging.

The Committee, appointed by the Supreme Court for monitoring the measures to prevent ragging in higher educational institutions, met here on Wednesday to review the progress made by regulatory bodies and stakeholders.

They had been directed by the court to implement the recommendations of the committee’s report on anti-ragging measures.

The committee felt that release of grants under schemes of the University Grants Commission (UGC) should be linked to compliance by institutions with the directions of the Supreme Court in this regard.

Incentives by way of larger grants should be provided by the Commission to higher educational institutions which ensure that ragging in any form does not take place on their campuses.

The Committee also asked the regulatory bodies to direct educational institutions to incorporate in admission notices appropriate messages regarding ‘zero tolerance’ towards ‘ragging.’

The Committee reiterated that as the Supreme Court has upheld the recommendation that ragging lowered the standards of higher education, each regulatory body responsible for maintaining standards of higher education was required to ensure that the directions of the Court were strictly complied with.

If institutions do not take adequate steps for redressing grievances when an incident of ragging is reported, the regulatory bodies must conduct enquiries through fact finding committees, the committee observed.

Since the academic session is to commence shortly, the Committee urged the Centre to take up intensive multi-media publicity campaign to reinforce anti-ragging measures as directed by the Supreme Court.

The UGC representative informed the Committee that a cell had been formed in the Commission to look after the matters relating to ragging in universities and colleges. The visiting committee, set up by the UGC for the 11th Plan Development assistance, shall be responsible for sensitising the institutions against ragging.

Godfrey Phillips Bravery Awards

MUMBAI: The 16th Godfrey Phillips Bravery Awards were presented here on Thursday where ordinary citizens were felicitated for their acts of valour.

In the Physical Bravery category, Anil Dhamankar from Maharashtra received the Gold award for saving 11 fishermen from drowning. Swapnil Jadhav and actor Muzammil Ibrahim were conferred Silver awards, while Shantanu Kumar Laskar won the Bronze award.

Actress Sudha Chandran was conferred the Mind-of-Steel Award for overcoming a physical impairment.

In the Social Bravery category, Savita, former sex worker, who spread awareness about condoms among truckers; Bhaskar Yadavrao Pawar, who set up a home for the aged; and Nisarga Nature Club, which undertakes tree plantation, were also honoured.

The awards carry cash prizes ranging from Rs.30,000 to Rs.50,000. A special award of Rs.11,000 was given to 15-year-old Nihal Ramakant Borkar for saving his friend’s life

BrahMos Aerospace, ISRO sign pact

Thiruvananthapuram: The BrahMos Aerospace has signed an agreement with Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) for taking up engineering and integration of the space agency’s launch vehicles PSLV and GSLV.

The Rs. 25-crore pact involves work on ISRO’s tankages, special aluminium work and all titanium work, a senior BrahMos official said here on Wedsnesday.

The Brahmos facility would also take up space technology-related infrastructure work for ISRO’s future missions.

Brahmos Aerospace established its unit here early this year by taking over the State-owned Kerala High-tech Industries Ltd (KELTEC). Even when it was a State-run facility, it used to supply some components and sub-assemblies to ISRO. — PTI

Indo-French nuclear accord ‘technically ready’

Hyderabad: French Ambassador Jerome Bonnafont declared here on Thursday that a bilateral agreement between France and India on civilian nuclear energy cooperation was “technically ready” and it could be signed as soon as the IAEA safeguards pact was okayed and the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group granted exemption.

In an interview to The Hindu, he said it was France which “originated” the idea in 1998 that there was need for a specific status for India as far as civilian nuclear energy cooperation was concerned.

The set of agreements that India was discussing with the IAEA, NSG, France, Russia and the U.S. was the direct consequence of “this conviction of ours” that as India was a responsible nuclear power (even if it is not a member of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty), there had to be a special regime for it to have sustainable development.

“We are in favour of the IAEA agreement if India decides to do so, to enter into force.” France had repeatedly said that it was in favour of NSG exemption for India.

“Win-win situation”

Mr. Bonnafont said it was impossible to have an agreement without IAEA nod and NSG exemption as it was against international law. “We believe that it is not up to us to talk for India, but if we look at our experience of civilian nuclear energy, the decisions we have made had enhanced our sovereignty, increased our energy independence and at the same time put us in the best position in Europe to fight climate change. We believe it is a win-win situation for India and the world to go in that direction.”

Describing the relations between India and France as excellent, he said it was “very old friendship” that had developed into a strategic partnership, which meant that France and India shared the same view of what the world should become.

On bilateral trade, he was optimistic of meeting the target of doubling the existing two-way trade of more than 6 billion euros to 12 billion euros by 2012 as envisaged by French President Nicolas Sarkozy and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.

Mr. Bonnafont described the joint building of Scorpene submarine as a flagship project that involved technology transfer, cooperation from company-to-company and strategic vision of relationship.

On the education front, he said France planned to triple in the next few years the number of students visiting it from 1,000 to 1,500 at present.

Consulates

Two more French consulates would be opened by the end of the year — in Bangalore and Kolkata. The Bangalore consulate would cover both Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh, he said.

Reading the Afghan equations correctly

India’s priority should be to insulate national security from the negative fallout of the U.S-led war, while remaining focussed on Afghan reconstruction.

It has almost been a month since the National Security Advisor exhorted public opinion makers to pay attention to the criticality of the situation in Afghanistan and India’s strategy towards it. Unfortunately, there has been no taker so far in our strategic community and corporate media.

Meanwhile, Afghan Defence Minister Abdul Rahim Wardak just concluded a weeklong visit to India. According to a terse uncommunicative government statement, he discussed “matters of mutual interest and defence cooperation” with Defence Minister A.K. Antony. He also visited defence establishments in Bangalore. The Afghan media reported that Kabul was considering sending its military personnel for training in counter-insurgency operations in specialised institutions of the Indian Army and that Mr. Wardak’s mission aimed at seeking Indian help in “operationalising” the Soviet-era helicopter gunships in Kabul’s inventory and medium helicopters providing back-up, which are an effective weapon system for hunting down the Taliban.

Mr. Wardak’s itinerary included a visit to Jammu & Kashmir, presumably to see firsthand how India tackled militancy successfully. It drew attention in the region. An Iranian report commented that Mr. Wardak’s J&K visit was “loaded with symbolism” in terms of the “underlying message that will go to Pakistan,” even though “there has been no evidence of Taliban or al-Qaeda militants’ presence in Kashmir.”

Indeed, within 48 hours of his visit, the Taliban struck. On April 12, a suicide bomber killed two personnel of the Border Roads Organisation. Five other Indians were injured. In a chilling reminder, the Taliban promptly claimed responsibility. In a pattern all too familiar by now, it signalled that India should stay out of the fratricidal war in Afghanistan, which is increasingly acquiring the character of resistance to foreign military occupation.

Once again, the Taliban restricted itself to hitting Indian interests on Afghan soil. It is a reminder that at the end of the day, India does not figure on the Taliban radar despite the repeated attempts by our country to portray itself as a frontline state in America’s “war on terror.” The Taliban has all along been shrewd enough not to widen the gyre of its war needlessly. The war is not a moveable feast to the Taliban. It has a well-defined agenda of capturing power in Kabul from where it was summarily evicted in the autumn of 2001. It won’t dissipate its energy and resources, and, instead, is focussing on Afghanistan’s perceived national liberation. Its repeated message to the outside world is “leave us alone.” New Delhi must read this message correctly.

Equally, New Delhi must take note that the erstwhile Northern Alliance (NA) groups, which it supported as the anti-Taliban resistance during 1997-2001, have changed tack and commenced secret talks with the Taliban in the recent months. To quote a spokesman of the NA groups, which come under the umbrella of the United National Front (UNF): “We are both Muslims, we are both Afghans, and we are both dissatisfied with the [Kabul] government’s performance.”

Incidentally, the UNF claims the support of over 40 per cent of the Members of Parliament, apart from scores of influential figures in Afghan politics. Clearly, its attempt is to draw the Taliban into the political process and to underscore the point that a power-sharing arrangement is possible. The Taliban has reciprocated. A recent statement said: “There is no doubt that the former commanders of the Jihad have made a lot of sacrifices for Islam and for the path of freeing the country [from foreign occupation]… Now it is necessary that they sacrifice once again for getting rid of this [U.S.] invasion.”

Indeed, the Afghan political chessboard is rapidly changing. This was inevitable, as the war has reached a stalemate. Influential members of the government empathise with the UNF’s approach. Education Minister Mohammed Hanif Atmar, a close ally of President Hamid Karzai, stated recently that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) should allow the Afghan local communities to take over the fight against militancy. Mr. Karzai himself proposed at the recent NATO summit in Bucharest that in the first instance, the security of Kabul be turned over to the Afghans. (However, the NATO leaders, at the U.S. behest, ignored the suggestion.)

The tussle is not confined to “Afghanistanisation” of security, either. It also forms part of a struggle building up over next year’s presidential election. For the Americans, the stakes are very high in the transition of power. A pliant regime must remain in Kabul. However, that is easier said than done as the Afghans are fiercely independent. Britain’s Independent newspaper noted that Mr. Karzai was “increasingly at odds with his Western backers, criticising the British policy in Helmand and blocking the appointment of Lord “Paddy” Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon as the U.N. envoy to Kabul.”

At any rate, there are indications that Zalmay Khalilzad, high-profile U.S. ambassador to the U.N., is leaving his Cabinet post and wants to be “at the service of the Afghan people.” (The Afghan Constitution, which American experts drafted in 2002, provides for Afghans ‘dual’ Afghan-American citizenships as in the case of Mr. Wardak or Mr. Khalilzad to hold public office in Kabul.) The neoconservative circles in the U.S. have been insistently projecting Mr. Khalilzad’s candidacy though Mr. Karzai intends to seek re-election. Mr. Khalilzad is an impeccable “insider” for the neocons as also for the U.S. politico-security establishment and, therefore, his presidential ambitions possibly enjoy credibility.

But indigenisation of the Afghan war is also a matter concerning regional powers, which increasingly realise the importance of distinguishing between the Taliban and the remnants of the al-Qaeda operating in the borderlands straddling the Durand Line. The political leadership of the Awami National Party (ANP) in power in Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province, which enjoys Mr. Karzai’s confidence, has initiated formal contacts with the “local Taliban.” The ANP has frontally challenged the near-cynical U.S. strategy of incrementally “pushing” the locus of the anti-Taliban operations into Pakistani territory so that NATO casualties will be reduced to a minimum inside Afghanistan and the opposition to the war in the European opinion kept in check.

The very same regional trend of revisiting the Taliban problem is apparent in Uzbekistan President Islam Karimov’s call at the NATO summit. He said the so-called “six-plus-two” format which worked for reconciling the Taliban and other Afghan groups and bringing them together within a broad-based government should be revived and enlarged into a “six-plus-three” format including NATO, apart from China, Kyrgyztsan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Iran, Pakistan, Russia and the U.S. But, unsurprisingly, Washington keeps mum on democratising the “war on terror.”

Mr. Karimov’s priority has been steadfast through the past decade-and-a-half of the Taliban saga — Uzbekistan must have a stable external environment. But for Washington, the Afghan cauldron is boiling with a geopolitical broth of highly secretive ingredients — NATO’s expansion into South Asia; the U.S. containment policy toward Russia and China; NATO’s role as a global political organisation; eventual deployment of the U.S. missile defence systems in the South Asian region; oil, and so on. The agenda dovetails with the U.S. global strategy of dominating the 21st century.
Signals for India

What is there in it for India? Regrettably, Indian discourses have not taken up the NSA’s call for a debate on our Afghan policy. Given the “Euro-Atlanticist” outlook of our think tankers, it is not surprising that the Afghan problem is of low priority. But then, the responsibility for this lapse also falls on the government. The government must first speak its mind so that public opinion can gauge where national interests lie. Are we reading the political equations in Kabul correctly? Evidently, the margin of error is nil, as the tragic death of M.P. Singh and C. Govindaswamy in the remote fastness of Afghanistan’s Nimroz province testifies.

Meanwhile, there is a danger that sooner or later someone in our midst may conjure up a fantastic thesis that SIMI is a Taliban clone, which makes India a frontline state in the U.S. “war on terror” and commit our government to an assertive role in eradicating militarily the Taliban “menace.” However, we are not the “natural allies” of the U.S. Our priority should be to insulate national security from the negative fallout of the U.S-led war, while remaining focussed on Afghan reconstruction.

Of course, Washington will be delighted if a country of limitless manpower like India ventures on a turf where “Old Europeans” wearied of all wars fear to tread — more so when the elected government in Islamabad too has become a reluctant partner. NATO will feel greatly relieved. The “inter-operability” of the Indian and NATO forces may get a fillip. But a troubling question arises: what will the Taliban think? Besides, we have experienced the searing pain of national tragedy ensuing from missteps in another neighbouring country. We cannot repeat past mistakes.

(The writer is a former ambassador belonging to the Indian Foreign Service.)

A lesson in statecraft, from Nepal to India

While Nepal’s erstwhile ruling parties are building peace with their Maoists, India is stuck with the disastrous Salwa Judum. If the Indian Maoists have something to learn from their Nepali comrades, the same is true of the Indian establishment as well.

While the Maoists have earned applause around the world for their stunning victory in Nepal’s Constituent Assembly elections, spare a thought for the two defeated establishment parties — the Nepali Congress and the Unified Marxist-Leninists (UML) — whose wisdom, statesmanship and political courage helped a powerful rebel group come down from the mountains and enter power through the ballot box.

Things need not have been this way. When King Gyanendra began asserting his authority from 2002, his alibi was the failure of successive governments to defeat the Maoist insurgency. After six years of armed struggle, the People’s Liberation Army and the ‘Royal’ Nepal Army had fought each other to a standstill. Each side was capable of staging punishing strikes on the other but in strategic terms, an impasse had set in which could have dragged on for years. While Gyanendra chose to press for an outright military victory, the Maoists sought to break out of this stalemate by opening a political front of struggle. On their part, the NC and the UML found themselves on the horns of a dilemma. To the extent to which they rejected the Maoists’ demands and use of violence, a section of their leadership found the King’s call for a fight to the finish appealing. But another section also knew that the violence of the Maoists was not merely nihilistic and that the rebels’ demands enjoyed support amongst the poor and marginalised. If some way could be found to get the Maoists to enter the political arena, they argued, not only would this help to bring peace to Nepal but a new power equation might get established which could further the struggle against autocratic monarchy.

Until February 2005, the dominant section of the NC and the UML leadership continued to work closely with the palace. But after the king’s putsch, collaboration with the monarchy was no longer tenable. Slowly but surely, the centre of gravity within these two establishment parties began to move in the direction of peace negotiations with the Maoists. With the assistance of Nepali civil society leaders, an atmosphere of trust and confidence between the parties was built up, grounded in the twin objectives of peace and constitutional reform. Had they wanted, the NC and the UML could still have dragged their feet. They could have refused to deal with the Maoists, whom they blamed for attacking their cadres. But leaders like Girija Prasad Koirala and Madhav Kumar Nepal had the courage to place the future of the country above their partisan concerns. With the backing of India, they entered into a major understanding with the Maoists in November 2005. And the rest, as they say, is history.

Cynics will argue that these parties would have chosen not to enter into an agreement if they had known in advance that the Maoists would win the elections. No doubt the NC and the UML expected to triumph and have been a little churlish in defeat by refusing to join a Maoist-led coalition. But these parties also knew that bringing the Maoists in as an electoral force necessarily meant diluting their own share of power. And it was this willingness to pay a political price for the establishment of peace that makes the Nepali parties a breed apart.

Is there a lesson in this entire process for India? Writing in the Indian Express on Tuesday, the former head of the Research & Analysis Wing, P.K. Hormis Tharakan, said “the greatest advantage the government of India can hope to gain from the Maoist victory in Nepal is that it would have a demonstration effect on the Maoists in India.” Nobody who wants peace in India will disagree. Mr. Tharakan does not say so but it is obvious that as in Nepal, the Indian Maoists and security forces have entered a holding pattern. Each side’s capacity to inflict pain on the other may be growing but a knockout punch is out of the question. And yet, neither the government nor the Maoists are willing to explore other ways of pursuing their core objectives.

If the Indian establishment wants the Maoists to give up their armed struggle and take part in elections like their Nepali comrades, it will have to rely on more than political osmosis. For the Nepali ‘model’ is not just about the Maoists adapting creatively to changes in the national and international arena; it is equally about the ‘bourgeois’ parties there demonstrating a degree of statesmanship that has so far been completely absent in their counterparts south of the border.

Indeed, so backward is our political culture in relation to Nepal’s that instead of seeking ways of peacefully ending the naxalite insurgency, the Government of India has actually fuelled a new civil war. For the past three years, the Chhattisgarh government has been financing and arming a private vigilante death squad known as Salwa Judum (SJ), whose terror tactics have led to the forced displacement of tens of thousands of tribals from their homes. The Special Police Officers (SPOs), often minors, who form the core of SJ are accompanied by paramilitary forces and the police. Their modus operandi consists of forcing villages suspected of being sympathetic to the Maoists to relocate to strategic hamlets on the main road. Villagers who resist are attacked and killed, their huts and property looted and destroyed. Several independent inquiries — the most recent of which was by the National Commission for Child Rights — have confirmed the violation of human rights on a massive scale, including sexual violence. In Kota Nendra village, for example, during the course of an SJ attack in 2006, not only was a three-month-old burnt alive (his mother gave up eating and died soon after of grief) but other children were shot while bathing at the borewell and in the village pond.

Though the SJ is an initiative of the ruling BJP in the State, it has the full backing of the Congress at the Centre. In a recent appearance before the Supreme Court — which is hearing a PIL urging the disbanding of the vigilante squads — the Centre’s counsel actually argued that the government was forced to rely on civilian SPOs because the regular police were (allegedly) too scared to take on the Maoists. It is bad enough that the establishment insists on pursuing a purely military solution. But when it arms and dispatches untrained civilians to commit crimes, this makes the government, as the Chief Justice of India noted on March 31, guilty of abetment.

In Nepal, the political parties and the Maoist rebels realised that the civil war in their country would not be resolved militarily. The king was the only one who failed to recognise this reality and paid the price for his folly. In India, however, despite the military stalemate which prevails, both the establishment and the Maoists continue to believe in the supremacy of arms. And it is the people, mostly tribals, who are paying the price for the folly of others.

In Nepal, the peace process worked because civil society activists helped create an enabling atmosphere in favour of peace and justice. The PIL against Salwa Judum in the Supreme Court is so important precisely because it aims to strengthen the rule of law. In India, however, the natural inclination of the establishment is to look upon all criticism of official policy with suspicion. Thus, the Chhattisgarh government has chosen to accuse the petitioners — who include a former Secretary to the Government of India, two senior academics and a former MLA — of acting on behalf of the naxalites.

Last year, the widely respected medic and human rights defender, Binayak Sen, who had documented some of the excesses of the Salwa Judum, was arrested under the Chhattisgarh Special Security Act, which criminalises dissent. One year on, he is still in jail. In the newspaper article cited above, the former R&AW chief has questioned the wisdom of using anti-terror laws against individuals who might otherwise be in a position to mediate with rebel groups. He didn’t name any victims but Dr. Sen — who has just been named as the recipient of the prestigious Jonathan Mann Award for Global Health and Human Rights — is perhaps someone he had in mind. Another example is Lachit Bordoloi, the Assamese journalist and writer, who actually helped the government establish contact with the underground United Liberation front of Asom (ULFA). Last February, he was inexplicably arrested and charged under the draconian National Security Act.

If the Indian establishment really wants Maoists to follow the path of their Nepali comrades, it should listen to what the UML’s Madhav Kumar Nepal has to say. I asked him in Kathmandu recently whether he had any advice for India on dealing with the Maoists. Though still smarting from his electoral defeat, he said the government should address the underlying problems of the poor and create the space for the naxalites to come forward for dialogue. “This will be less costly for the country and people than trying to deal with them militarily.” Is anyone in New Delhi listening?

The launch of two remote-sensing satellites today is part of ISRO’s plans for expanding its constellation of earth-observing satellites.

Twenty years ago, the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) launched the country’s first operational earth-observation satellite, the IRS-1A. In the years since then, ISRO has sent up 10 more remote-sensing satellites. (Six of these satellites are currently operational, including the ageing IRS-1D, which was launched more than 10 years ago with a design life of three years and is reportedly used sparingly these days.)

“Today, India is one of the major providers of earth observation data in the world in a variety of spatial, spectral and temporal resolutions, meeting the needs of many applications of relevance to national development,” point out Ranganath R. Navalgund, director of ISRO’s Space Applications Centre at Ahmedabad, V. Jayaraman, director of Earth Observations System at ISRO Headquarters in Bangalore, and P.S. Roy of the National Remote Sensing Agency in Hyderabad in a journal paper published last December.

In the early days, well before its own satellites were launched, ISRO used data from foreign satellites, such as the American Landsat and French SPOT satellites, to demonstrate the practical benefits that could be got from remote sensing, says S. Chandrasekhar, who was earlier at ISRO headquarters and is currently on the faculty of IIM, Bangalore. ISRO also worked closely with government departments and other user agencies to understand their needs as well as to make their staff familiar with the technology. As a result, when the IRS satellites became available there was already a user community within the country that wanted the data.

The images from IRS satellites’ watchful eyes are put to use in many ways. They are used to make more accurate crop acreage and production estimates; for drought and flood damage assessment; environmental monitoring, including of forest cover, and to assess biodiversity; for better water resource management; to map minerals and other resources; for snow and glacier studies; urban planning; watershed monitoring and management; and for coastal and ocean studies.

The constellation of Indian remote-sensing satellites is set to grow further. ISRO plans to carry out over 30 remote sensing satellite missions by 2025, Dr. Jayaraman told The Hindu.

On Monday (April 28), two such satellites are to travel into space aboard the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV). The Cartosat-2A is similar to the Cartosat-2 that was launched in January 2007. The panchromatic camera on these satellites offer a resolution of better than one metre, the best so far of any operational Indian satellite. Such resolution makes it possible to discriminate even small features on the ground, distinguish characteristics of buildings and see individual vehicles.

An ISRO press release last year pointed out that such high-resolution images would be invaluable for the planning, monitoring and implementation of urban infrastructure and transportation systems; the mapping of individual settlements, roads, urban complexes and urban utilities; and for planning rural roads and infrastructure that required detailed terrain evaluation. It could also be used for delineation and characterisation of micro watersheds and monitoring of coastal land use.

But the cameras on the Cartosat-2 and 2A take images that cover the ground in strips just 10 km wide. Having two such satellites in the orbit at the same time would therefore allow large areas to be imaged more quickly and to revisit certain areas with less delay. The latest annual report of the Department of Space indicates that the Cartosat-2B could also be launched during the current financial year.

The Indian Mini Satellite-1 (IMS-1), which was earlier called the Third World Satellite (TWSAT), will be a co-passenger with the Cartosat-2A on the PSLV. While the latter weighs 690 kg, the IMS-1, a small satellite, weighs slightly over 80 kg at lift-off.

“The IMS-1 should be seen as a technology demonstrator for miniaturising both space and ground segments,” said Dr. Jayaraman. “The low-cost user terminal has been designed as an integrated one that can receive data directly from the satellite and process that data. With such terminals, developing countries that do not currently use remote-sensing can learn to receive and use imageries from the satellite’s multi-spectral camera. The idea is to aid capacity building in such countries.”
Hyperspectral camera

The IMS-1 will also carry the country’s first hyperspectral camera. Remote-sensing cameras that take images in different colours typically do so in just a few bands. The IMS-1’s multi-spectral camera, for instance, captures images in four colour bands. The satellite’s hyperspectral camera, on the other hand, distinguishes 64 colour bands. (This hyperspectral camera is said to be a slightly modified version of the instrument that will fly on Chandrayaan-1, India’s first lunar mission.)

Hyperspectral imaging has been extensively used for mineral exploration in Australia, according to George Joseph, who played a key role in developing optical cameras for the IRS satellites and retired as director of the Space Applications Centre in Ahmedabad. It could reveal many fine details about vegetation, such as morphological differences, biochemical changes occurring in the leaf and water and nutrient stress, which do not show up when observations are made in broad spectral bands. Hyperspectral imaging could be useful for a variety of ocean studies too, Dr. Joseph told The Hindu. He currently heads the Centre for Space Science and Technology Education in Asia and the Pacific, a United Nations-affiliated body based in Dehra Dun.

The Oceansat-2 satellite, which too may be launched this year, is intended to replace the Oceansat-1 satellite that was launched in 1999. Apart from an ocean colour monitor, Oceansat-2 will be equipped with an instrument that uses a narrow radar beam to ascertain wind direction and velocity. The satellite will also carry an Italian instrument to use signals from GPS satellites for deriving temperature and humidity profiles of the atmosphere.

Over the next four to five years, ISRO could launch a dozen or so earth-observation satellites, going by the mission profile given in the Department of Space’s annual report for 2007-2008.

Next year could see the launch of the country’s first active radar satellite, the Radar Imaging Satellite-1 (RISAT-1). Optical cameras on the IRS satellites rely on picking up sunlight reflected from the earth’s surface. So they cannot work at night or when clouds block their view of the ground below. A radar satellite, on the other hand, can take images by night as well as by day and can see through clouds, fog and haze. The radar images from the satellite could also provide information on soil moisture.

Megha-Tropiques, a joint Indo-French effort at building a satellite dedicated to atmospheric and climate research in the tropics, could be ready by the end of 2009. A Statement of Intent to build such a satellite was signed by the space agencies of the two countries nine years ago. The instruments on the satellite are intended to help scientists understand better the water cycle in the tropics as well as how rain-bearing cloud systems (including cyclones) form and evolve. Another advanced meteorological satellite, the Insat-3D, could also fly during the 2009-2010 financial year.

Remote-sensing satellites usually circle the Earth at a height of a few hundred kilometres. ISRO plans to put a Cartosat-type camera on a satellite that will be placed in geostationary orbit at a distance of about 36,000 km. In this orbit, the satellite matches the Earth’s rotation and therefore appears stationary from the ground. Stationed over India, the ‘Geo-HR Imager’ (as the satellite has been named) would be able to take images of the country and neighbouring regions whenever needed. By contrast, an orbiting satellite would be able to image the ground only when it flies overhead, which could be after a few days or even weeks depending on its orbit. Geo-HR Imager could therefore significantly aid disaster management efforts. Its imagery would also provide inputs for natural resources management. ISRO has currently scheduled the satellite for launch during 2010-2011.

In 2011-12, Cartosat-3 could go into the orbit. The panchromatic camera on this satellite is expected to provide images with a resolution of 30 cm. Currently, the American WorldView-1 satellite launched in September last year offers the highest resolution imageries that are commercially available and the resolution of those images is 50 cm. WorldView-2, which will be launched next year, will provide images with a resolution of 46 cm.

Apart from meeting Indian application and user demands, ISRO’s earth observation programme would also complement global efforts to use satellites for monitoring and studying the planet, said Dr. Jayaraman. There is considerable international interest in including several Indian missions as part of the planned global constellation of earth observation satellites, he added.

PSLV scores again

India’s Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) is proving to be hugely versatile. On April 28, the launcher successfully carried no fewer than 10 satellites and ejected them with precision into their designated orbits. Since its first successful launch in 1994, the rocket has gone from strength to strength. In the course of 12 flights, the PSLV has carried 10 Indian remote sensing satellites, 14 small satellites for foreign customers (including eight launched on Monday), an amateur radio satellite, a meteorological satellite, and the country’s first recoverable space capsule. There have also been two dedicated launches carrying foreign satellites. Later this year, the highly dependable rocket will take Chandrayaan-1, India’s first lunar probe, on the first leg of its voyage to the Moon. The PSLV was conceived as a launcher to take India’s remote sensing satellites to a polar orbit. In its first successful flight, it carried a satellite weighing about 800 kg. Since then, scientists and engineers of the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) have steadily developed the launcher’s capabilities and today the rocket can carry a payload that is twice as heavy.

The availability of this launcher has been a crucial factor in ISRO being able to set up a large constellation of earth-observation satellites. These satellites produce data that serve myriad practical purposes, from better crop acreage estimation to providing inputs for disaster relief. Monday’s launch saw the PSLV put into orbit two more remote sensing satellites, Cartosat-2A and the Indian Mini Satellite-1. ISRO has ambitious plans to expand the number and range of its earth-viewing satellites in space — and those satellites too will no doubt go up on the PSLV. Although the rocket has earned an enviable reputation as a rugged workhorse, India is still a relatively small player in a commercial market dominated by launch vehicles like Europe’s Ariane 5 that can carry heavy communication satellites. This is not a market segment that can be served either by the PSLV or the current generation of the Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV). India can begin to think of competing in this area only when the next generation GSLV Mark-III becomes operational. Its first flight could take place in a year or two from now, according to the latest annual report of the Department of Space. The PSLV has proved to be a terrific asset, but Indian launch vehicles have quite some distance to travel and bigger payloads to transport before they can take on the best in the world.

Should the 1950 treaty between Indian and Nepal be scrapped?

The Treaty of Peace and Friendship between India and Nepal is nearly six decades old; its relevance for India’s security in today’s context is limited and questionable.

The Maoist demand for “scrapping” the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship between India and Nepal has been greeted with a sense of alarm, as if it is something new or sinister. In fact, it is neither. The treaty, which was a straightforward imitation of understandings dating back to British India days, and basically offered economic opportunities in India for Nepalese nationals against Nepalese assurances that India’s security concerns would be respected, became an irritant in India-Nepal relations as soon as it was signed on 31 July, 1950. In Nepal’s eyes, India’s growing sense of insecurity, generated by an apparently aggressive and expansionist China, had compelled it to yield to expediency, abandon its support for the incipient democratic movement against the autocratic Rana regime, and seek to constrain Nepal’s sovereignty so that it was compatible with India’s security perceptions. The treaty, signed between the Indian Ambassador with Prime Minister Mohun Shumshere Rana (a disrespect for protocol which added insult to Kathmandu’s sense of injury) in the last days of his discredited regime, was accompanied by an exchange of letters which was not made public until many years later — in 1959, when they were placed on the table of the Indian Parliament.

The pitch of Nepalese criticism at any given time has depended on the degree of hostility or political insecurity felt by a particular power centre in Kathmandu vis-À-vis India. With the exception of King Tribhuvan (who escaped from Rana’s custody, was given refuge by Nehru, and who actually suggested Nepal’s merger with India), the monarchy in Nepal was actively engaged for several decades in undermining the treaty in letter, or spirit or both. Birendra’s Zone of Peace proposal was one such thinly disguised attempt. (An emissary from New Delhi was sent to Kathmandu to give a blow-by-blow picture of the implications for Nepal if the treaty was abrogated, and Birendra was said to be so shaken that the project was eventually abandoned).

But even when Nepal had a democratic dispensation, there was a certain unity across the political spectrum that, while the economic benefits accorded by the treaty were essential for Nepal, the treaty in its existing shape was not compatible with national self-respect. The Nepali Congress was the only party which usually hesitated to raise the matter of treaty revision, because of the close personal affinities between its leaders with Indian counterparts and their desire not to rock the boat of bilateral relations. But in private conversation they, too, voiced similar reservations.

In 1994, the CPN (UML) minority government assumed power after an election campaign dominated by issues such as abrogation of the 1950 treaty, ending the special relationship with India, renegotiating agreements on cooperation in water resources, and ending the recruitment of Nepalese gurkhas in the Indian Army — exactly the issues raised by the Maoists today. Yet, the UML was quick to moderate its positions as soon as it assumed office. Prime Minister Man Mohan Adhikari made it clear that he was not for abrogation of the treaty: “friendship treaties can be amended, they should never be abrogated.” An institutional arrangement at the Foreign Secretary level was set up in March 1995; but after a few rounds of discussion, it became clear that India was not interested in “amendment”: the treaty had either to be abrogated or maintained in its present form, as the text of the treaty did not provide for modifications. In private conversation, the Nepalese argued that this was not a very valid approach; the treaty had already been amended in 1950, even before the ink on the signatures was dry, by the exchange of letters accompanying it. It had effectively been amended again in 1965, through another exchange of letters which basically “committed” India to supply all of the Nepal Army’s armament needs. So why couldn’t it be amended again? But given India’s “either we keep it or you abrogate it” approach, Nepalese leaders did not go beyond making proforma noises about review of the treaty being under active discussion.

Gujral “doctrine”

The Gujral “doctrine,” which in effect promised all of India’s neighbours (especially Nepal) a bilateral relationship based on non-reciprocity, revived fresh hope in Nepal that the treaty could be “updated.” As Foreign Minister and later as Prime Minister, I.K. Gujral demonstrated a certain willingness to accommodate Nepalese expectations, as demonstrated by negotiations on the Mahakali Treaty and the transit route through India’s sensitive “Chicken’s Neck.” Foreign Minister Kamal Thapa visited India in August, 1998, with a “non-paper” which, for the first time, set out Nepalese ideas for a revision of the treaty. He made the mistake of publicising in advance the objective of his visit; the Nepalese media mentioned separate treaties on mutual security and economic cooperation accommodating both countries’ legitimate needs and concerns. But Thapa was sent back empty-handed — India’s traditional resistance to changing the treaty re-asserted itself.

Issue to the forefront

It has taken the remarkable electoral success of the Maoists to bring the issue again to the forefront. Should India continue to evade the issue, despite the widespread sentiment in Nepal favouring a revision? The treaty is nearly six decades old; its relevance for India’s security in today’s context is limited and questionable. China is no longer the only security concern in the sub-region, and in any case it is doubtful if it needs to ally itself with Nepal in order to create problems for India. The Himalayas have been replaced by the open border as India’s main defence perimeter. Pakistani activities in and through Nepal, migration, smuggling of narcotics and arms, terrorism, human trafficking, traditional cross-border trade and investment, regulation of the open border, development of border infrastructure and, above all, human insecurity have emerged as the urgent priorities. Management of water resources, environment and climate change, also have serious long-term implications for the security of both countries.

The treaty is already respected more in the breach than observance. Indian nationals in Nepal had long ago lost any entitlement under the “national treatment” clause; they can still travel to Nepal without a visa, and the Indian rupee is legal in Nepal, but permission to work, purchase property, and engage in activities on a par with the Nepalese is usually not available. Nepalese migrants to India, too, do not have the same rights they used to enjoy in many areas. Gurkha recruitment to the Indian Army continues but there is already a demand to phase this out and increase the intake of Indian Gurkhas.

Nepal has also from time to time projected its concerns about elements from India misusing the open border. Pro-democracy activists in Panchayat times, Maoists in recent years, armed Madhesi groups still more recently, have freely utilised the facility to challenge the government of the day, with Indian intelligence and security being either unable or unwilling to stop them. And the “national treatment” promised to Nepalese nationals in the matter of employment, business and property acquisition in India is becoming progressively more difficult to obtain.

India needs to review the treaty with an open mind rather than as a necessary evil — because the Maoists are demanding it. The first step would be to open the subject up for free debate within our own civil society, and explore the possibility of a cross-party consensus on the kind of treaty or cluster of treaties which would comprehensively address the real security concerns, military as well as non-conventional, for peoples on both sides of the border. Nepal should be encouraged to go in for a similar exercise. Thereafter, a track two interaction could seek to narrow the differences, with government representation but in the background. Official negotiations should ideally be the last phase. This long festering issue can and should be resolved to the mutual satisfaction of both countries in such a way that it promotes peace and development, and — hopefully — there are no future demands for its revision, at least for the next 50 years.