India’s priority should be to insulate national security from the negative fallout of the U.S-led war, while remaining focussed on Afghan reconstruction.
It has almost been a month since the National Security Advisor exhorted public opinion makers to pay attention to the criticality of the situation in Afghanistan and India’s strategy towards it. Unfortunately, there has been no taker so far in our strategic community and corporate media.
Meanwhile, Afghan Defence Minister Abdul Rahim Wardak just concluded a weeklong visit to India. According to a terse uncommunicative government statement, he discussed “matters of mutual interest and defence cooperation” with Defence Minister A.K. Antony. He also visited defence establishments in Bangalore. The Afghan media reported that Kabul was considering sending its military personnel for training in counter-insurgency operations in specialised institutions of the Indian Army and that Mr. Wardak’s mission aimed at seeking Indian help in “operationalising” the Soviet-era helicopter gunships in Kabul’s inventory and medium helicopters providing back-up, which are an effective weapon system for hunting down the Taliban.
Mr. Wardak’s itinerary included a visit to Jammu & Kashmir, presumably to see firsthand how India tackled militancy successfully. It drew attention in the region. An Iranian report commented that Mr. Wardak’s J&K visit was “loaded with symbolism” in terms of the “underlying message that will go to Pakistan,” even though “there has been no evidence of Taliban or al-Qaeda militants’ presence in Kashmir.”
Indeed, within 48 hours of his visit, the Taliban struck. On April 12, a suicide bomber killed two personnel of the Border Roads Organisation. Five other Indians were injured. In a chilling reminder, the Taliban promptly claimed responsibility. In a pattern all too familiar by now, it signalled that India should stay out of the fratricidal war in Afghanistan, which is increasingly acquiring the character of resistance to foreign military occupation.
Once again, the Taliban restricted itself to hitting Indian interests on Afghan soil. It is a reminder that at the end of the day, India does not figure on the Taliban radar despite the repeated attempts by our country to portray itself as a frontline state in America’s “war on terror.” The Taliban has all along been shrewd enough not to widen the gyre of its war needlessly. The war is not a moveable feast to the Taliban. It has a well-defined agenda of capturing power in Kabul from where it was summarily evicted in the autumn of 2001. It won’t dissipate its energy and resources, and, instead, is focussing on Afghanistan’s perceived national liberation. Its repeated message to the outside world is “leave us alone.” New Delhi must read this message correctly.
Equally, New Delhi must take note that the erstwhile Northern Alliance (NA) groups, which it supported as the anti-Taliban resistance during 1997-2001, have changed tack and commenced secret talks with the Taliban in the recent months. To quote a spokesman of the NA groups, which come under the umbrella of the United National Front (UNF): “We are both Muslims, we are both Afghans, and we are both dissatisfied with the [Kabul] government’s performance.”
Incidentally, the UNF claims the support of over 40 per cent of the Members of Parliament, apart from scores of influential figures in Afghan politics. Clearly, its attempt is to draw the Taliban into the political process and to underscore the point that a power-sharing arrangement is possible. The Taliban has reciprocated. A recent statement said: “There is no doubt that the former commanders of the Jihad have made a lot of sacrifices for Islam and for the path of freeing the country [from foreign occupation]… Now it is necessary that they sacrifice once again for getting rid of this [U.S.] invasion.”
Indeed, the Afghan political chessboard is rapidly changing. This was inevitable, as the war has reached a stalemate. Influential members of the government empathise with the UNF’s approach. Education Minister Mohammed Hanif Atmar, a close ally of President Hamid Karzai, stated recently that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) should allow the Afghan local communities to take over the fight against militancy. Mr. Karzai himself proposed at the recent NATO summit in Bucharest that in the first instance, the security of Kabul be turned over to the Afghans. (However, the NATO leaders, at the U.S. behest, ignored the suggestion.)
The tussle is not confined to “Afghanistanisation” of security, either. It also forms part of a struggle building up over next year’s presidential election. For the Americans, the stakes are very high in the transition of power. A pliant regime must remain in Kabul. However, that is easier said than done as the Afghans are fiercely independent. Britain’s Independent newspaper noted that Mr. Karzai was “increasingly at odds with his Western backers, criticising the British policy in Helmand and blocking the appointment of Lord “Paddy” Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon as the U.N. envoy to Kabul.”
At any rate, there are indications that Zalmay Khalilzad, high-profile U.S. ambassador to the U.N., is leaving his Cabinet post and wants to be “at the service of the Afghan people.” (The Afghan Constitution, which American experts drafted in 2002, provides for Afghans ‘dual’ Afghan-American citizenships as in the case of Mr. Wardak or Mr. Khalilzad to hold public office in Kabul.) The neoconservative circles in the U.S. have been insistently projecting Mr. Khalilzad’s candidacy though Mr. Karzai intends to seek re-election. Mr. Khalilzad is an impeccable “insider” for the neocons as also for the U.S. politico-security establishment and, therefore, his presidential ambitions possibly enjoy credibility.
But indigenisation of the Afghan war is also a matter concerning regional powers, which increasingly realise the importance of distinguishing between the Taliban and the remnants of the al-Qaeda operating in the borderlands straddling the Durand Line. The political leadership of the Awami National Party (ANP) in power in Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province, which enjoys Mr. Karzai’s confidence, has initiated formal contacts with the “local Taliban.” The ANP has frontally challenged the near-cynical U.S. strategy of incrementally “pushing” the locus of the anti-Taliban operations into Pakistani territory so that NATO casualties will be reduced to a minimum inside Afghanistan and the opposition to the war in the European opinion kept in check.
The very same regional trend of revisiting the Taliban problem is apparent in Uzbekistan President Islam Karimov’s call at the NATO summit. He said the so-called “six-plus-two” format which worked for reconciling the Taliban and other Afghan groups and bringing them together within a broad-based government should be revived and enlarged into a “six-plus-three” format including NATO, apart from China, Kyrgyztsan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Iran, Pakistan, Russia and the U.S. But, unsurprisingly, Washington keeps mum on democratising the “war on terror.”
Mr. Karimov’s priority has been steadfast through the past decade-and-a-half of the Taliban saga — Uzbekistan must have a stable external environment. But for Washington, the Afghan cauldron is boiling with a geopolitical broth of highly secretive ingredients — NATO’s expansion into South Asia; the U.S. containment policy toward Russia and China; NATO’s role as a global political organisation; eventual deployment of the U.S. missile defence systems in the South Asian region; oil, and so on. The agenda dovetails with the U.S. global strategy of dominating the 21st century.
Signals for India
What is there in it for India? Regrettably, Indian discourses have not taken up the NSA’s call for a debate on our Afghan policy. Given the “Euro-Atlanticist” outlook of our think tankers, it is not surprising that the Afghan problem is of low priority. But then, the responsibility for this lapse also falls on the government. The government must first speak its mind so that public opinion can gauge where national interests lie. Are we reading the political equations in Kabul correctly? Evidently, the margin of error is nil, as the tragic death of M.P. Singh and C. Govindaswamy in the remote fastness of Afghanistan’s Nimroz province testifies.
Meanwhile, there is a danger that sooner or later someone in our midst may conjure up a fantastic thesis that SIMI is a Taliban clone, which makes India a frontline state in the U.S. “war on terror” and commit our government to an assertive role in eradicating militarily the Taliban “menace.” However, we are not the “natural allies” of the U.S. Our priority should be to insulate national security from the negative fallout of the U.S-led war, while remaining focussed on Afghan reconstruction.
Of course, Washington will be delighted if a country of limitless manpower like India ventures on a turf where “Old Europeans” wearied of all wars fear to tread — more so when the elected government in Islamabad too has become a reluctant partner. NATO will feel greatly relieved. The “inter-operability” of the Indian and NATO forces may get a fillip. But a troubling question arises: what will the Taliban think? Besides, we have experienced the searing pain of national tragedy ensuing from missteps in another neighbouring country. We cannot repeat past mistakes.
(The writer is a former ambassador belonging to the Indian Foreign Service.)
It has almost been a month since the National Security Advisor exhorted public opinion makers to pay attention to the criticality of the situation in Afghanistan and India’s strategy towards it. Unfortunately, there has been no taker so far in our strategic community and corporate media.
Meanwhile, Afghan Defence Minister Abdul Rahim Wardak just concluded a weeklong visit to India. According to a terse uncommunicative government statement, he discussed “matters of mutual interest and defence cooperation” with Defence Minister A.K. Antony. He also visited defence establishments in Bangalore. The Afghan media reported that Kabul was considering sending its military personnel for training in counter-insurgency operations in specialised institutions of the Indian Army and that Mr. Wardak’s mission aimed at seeking Indian help in “operationalising” the Soviet-era helicopter gunships in Kabul’s inventory and medium helicopters providing back-up, which are an effective weapon system for hunting down the Taliban.
Mr. Wardak’s itinerary included a visit to Jammu & Kashmir, presumably to see firsthand how India tackled militancy successfully. It drew attention in the region. An Iranian report commented that Mr. Wardak’s J&K visit was “loaded with symbolism” in terms of the “underlying message that will go to Pakistan,” even though “there has been no evidence of Taliban or al-Qaeda militants’ presence in Kashmir.”
Indeed, within 48 hours of his visit, the Taliban struck. On April 12, a suicide bomber killed two personnel of the Border Roads Organisation. Five other Indians were injured. In a chilling reminder, the Taliban promptly claimed responsibility. In a pattern all too familiar by now, it signalled that India should stay out of the fratricidal war in Afghanistan, which is increasingly acquiring the character of resistance to foreign military occupation.
Once again, the Taliban restricted itself to hitting Indian interests on Afghan soil. It is a reminder that at the end of the day, India does not figure on the Taliban radar despite the repeated attempts by our country to portray itself as a frontline state in America’s “war on terror.” The Taliban has all along been shrewd enough not to widen the gyre of its war needlessly. The war is not a moveable feast to the Taliban. It has a well-defined agenda of capturing power in Kabul from where it was summarily evicted in the autumn of 2001. It won’t dissipate its energy and resources, and, instead, is focussing on Afghanistan’s perceived national liberation. Its repeated message to the outside world is “leave us alone.” New Delhi must read this message correctly.
Equally, New Delhi must take note that the erstwhile Northern Alliance (NA) groups, which it supported as the anti-Taliban resistance during 1997-2001, have changed tack and commenced secret talks with the Taliban in the recent months. To quote a spokesman of the NA groups, which come under the umbrella of the United National Front (UNF): “We are both Muslims, we are both Afghans, and we are both dissatisfied with the [Kabul] government’s performance.”
Incidentally, the UNF claims the support of over 40 per cent of the Members of Parliament, apart from scores of influential figures in Afghan politics. Clearly, its attempt is to draw the Taliban into the political process and to underscore the point that a power-sharing arrangement is possible. The Taliban has reciprocated. A recent statement said: “There is no doubt that the former commanders of the Jihad have made a lot of sacrifices for Islam and for the path of freeing the country [from foreign occupation]… Now it is necessary that they sacrifice once again for getting rid of this [U.S.] invasion.”
Indeed, the Afghan political chessboard is rapidly changing. This was inevitable, as the war has reached a stalemate. Influential members of the government empathise with the UNF’s approach. Education Minister Mohammed Hanif Atmar, a close ally of President Hamid Karzai, stated recently that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) should allow the Afghan local communities to take over the fight against militancy. Mr. Karzai himself proposed at the recent NATO summit in Bucharest that in the first instance, the security of Kabul be turned over to the Afghans. (However, the NATO leaders, at the U.S. behest, ignored the suggestion.)
The tussle is not confined to “Afghanistanisation” of security, either. It also forms part of a struggle building up over next year’s presidential election. For the Americans, the stakes are very high in the transition of power. A pliant regime must remain in Kabul. However, that is easier said than done as the Afghans are fiercely independent. Britain’s Independent newspaper noted that Mr. Karzai was “increasingly at odds with his Western backers, criticising the British policy in Helmand and blocking the appointment of Lord “Paddy” Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hamdon as the U.N. envoy to Kabul.”
At any rate, there are indications that Zalmay Khalilzad, high-profile U.S. ambassador to the U.N., is leaving his Cabinet post and wants to be “at the service of the Afghan people.” (The Afghan Constitution, which American experts drafted in 2002, provides for Afghans ‘dual’ Afghan-American citizenships as in the case of Mr. Wardak or Mr. Khalilzad to hold public office in Kabul.) The neoconservative circles in the U.S. have been insistently projecting Mr. Khalilzad’s candidacy though Mr. Karzai intends to seek re-election. Mr. Khalilzad is an impeccable “insider” for the neocons as also for the U.S. politico-security establishment and, therefore, his presidential ambitions possibly enjoy credibility.
But indigenisation of the Afghan war is also a matter concerning regional powers, which increasingly realise the importance of distinguishing between the Taliban and the remnants of the al-Qaeda operating in the borderlands straddling the Durand Line. The political leadership of the Awami National Party (ANP) in power in Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province, which enjoys Mr. Karzai’s confidence, has initiated formal contacts with the “local Taliban.” The ANP has frontally challenged the near-cynical U.S. strategy of incrementally “pushing” the locus of the anti-Taliban operations into Pakistani territory so that NATO casualties will be reduced to a minimum inside Afghanistan and the opposition to the war in the European opinion kept in check.
The very same regional trend of revisiting the Taliban problem is apparent in Uzbekistan President Islam Karimov’s call at the NATO summit. He said the so-called “six-plus-two” format which worked for reconciling the Taliban and other Afghan groups and bringing them together within a broad-based government should be revived and enlarged into a “six-plus-three” format including NATO, apart from China, Kyrgyztsan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Iran, Pakistan, Russia and the U.S. But, unsurprisingly, Washington keeps mum on democratising the “war on terror.”
Mr. Karimov’s priority has been steadfast through the past decade-and-a-half of the Taliban saga — Uzbekistan must have a stable external environment. But for Washington, the Afghan cauldron is boiling with a geopolitical broth of highly secretive ingredients — NATO’s expansion into South Asia; the U.S. containment policy toward Russia and China; NATO’s role as a global political organisation; eventual deployment of the U.S. missile defence systems in the South Asian region; oil, and so on. The agenda dovetails with the U.S. global strategy of dominating the 21st century.
Signals for India
What is there in it for India? Regrettably, Indian discourses have not taken up the NSA’s call for a debate on our Afghan policy. Given the “Euro-Atlanticist” outlook of our think tankers, it is not surprising that the Afghan problem is of low priority. But then, the responsibility for this lapse also falls on the government. The government must first speak its mind so that public opinion can gauge where national interests lie. Are we reading the political equations in Kabul correctly? Evidently, the margin of error is nil, as the tragic death of M.P. Singh and C. Govindaswamy in the remote fastness of Afghanistan’s Nimroz province testifies.
Meanwhile, there is a danger that sooner or later someone in our midst may conjure up a fantastic thesis that SIMI is a Taliban clone, which makes India a frontline state in the U.S. “war on terror” and commit our government to an assertive role in eradicating militarily the Taliban “menace.” However, we are not the “natural allies” of the U.S. Our priority should be to insulate national security from the negative fallout of the U.S-led war, while remaining focussed on Afghan reconstruction.
Of course, Washington will be delighted if a country of limitless manpower like India ventures on a turf where “Old Europeans” wearied of all wars fear to tread — more so when the elected government in Islamabad too has become a reluctant partner. NATO will feel greatly relieved. The “inter-operability” of the Indian and NATO forces may get a fillip. But a troubling question arises: what will the Taliban think? Besides, we have experienced the searing pain of national tragedy ensuing from missteps in another neighbouring country. We cannot repeat past mistakes.
(The writer is a former ambassador belonging to the Indian Foreign Service.)
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