The last few months have seen much violence in the Naga-inhabited areas of India. The National Socialist Council of Nagalim led by Thuingaleng Muivah and Isak Chisi Swu, or the NSCN(I-M), spilt on November 23, 2007, and a new armed outfit emerged from within its fold: the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Unification), or the NSCN(U). The violence between these factions has led to more than 40 deaths in April-May alone.
This surge in violence compelled Naga civil society groups led by the Joint Forum of Gaonburahs (village headmen) and Doaibashis (elders), or the JFGBDB, supported by the Naga Hoho (Council), to convene several peoples’ consultative meetings to garner support for an overarching ceasefire between the underground outfits. Subsequently, on May 20, an eventful day for Nagaland, tens of thousands of Naga people took out a “peace march” across the State demanding that the insurgents withdraw from civilian areas and respect the ceasefire between different outfits as declared by the JFGBDB on July 24, 2007.
Surprisingly, the wishes of the common people have been brushed aside by the NSCN(I-M), the NSCN(U) and the NSCN(Khaplang), and their incessant factional fighting has vitiated the atmosphere. On April 25, the residents of Diphupar ‘B,’ a village about 10 km from Dimapur, Nagaland’s commercial hub, were hit by clashes between the NSCN (I-M) and the NSCN(U). This evoked a strong response from the residents, and village council chairman Kakiho Sumi and headman L.P. Therie appealed to all the underground factions to respect the sentiments of the civilian population and refrain from resorting to gunfights in populated areas.
Though civil society bodies such as the JFGBDB, the Naga Hoho, the Naga Peace Centre and the United Naga Council, to name a few, have openly rallied around efforts for peace, their calls appear to be largely ineffective in the face of the growing factional violence. Worse still is a situation that shows the absence of the “rule of law” due to a weak state structure in these areas. The state security forces have remained either aloof or inconsequential when it comes to enforcing law and order. And the local administrators appear to have little or no influence on either the insurgent outfits or the social base from where they draw their recruits. Rather, in the context of the March 5 Nagaland State Assembly elections, politicians such as Niphiu Rio, who went on to become the Chief Minister, sought the support of the NSCN(I-M) in order to ensure the electoral success of his party, the Nagaland People’s Front (NPF).
The increasing violence and social divisiveness in Naga society is advocated by insurgent groups aligned along tribal lines: the NSCN(I-M) is mostly made up of Thangkhuls, the NSCN(U) of Semas, and the NSCN(K) of Konyaks, while the Naga National Council (NNC) comprises Angamis. The other major tribe, Ao, oscillates between the three factions, but mostly leans towards the NSCN(I-M).
In this context, what explains the inter-group violence plaguing the Naga-inhabited territories that has claimed a growing toll of lives in recent months? Currently there is no violence between the security forces and the NSCN(I-M) or the NSCN(K), thanks to ceasefire agreements signed by the Union government with both of them, in 1997 and 2001 respectively.
Interesting insights can be drawn from three contending theories of ethnic violence. According to the rational choice theory advocated by David Lake and Donald Rothchild, “information and commitment to peace problems” between ethnic or tribal groups leads to a situation of “security dilemma” or “uncertainty” over the other’s intentions and can lead to violence. Thus, ethnic or tribal groups view violence as rational, propelled mostly by an incentive to maximise security.
Violence is also caused by the fact that in such an uncertain situation, ethnic or tribal groups overestimate an adversary’s hostile intentions and escalate pre-emptive or preventive violence — call it what you may. Negotiations between insurgent groups or their social base becomes unthinkable at this stage as there is a credible commitment problem.
An alternative theory advocated by Rui de Figueiredo and Barry R. Weingast, also based on rational choice, argue that predatory ethnic or tribal elites, and not uncertainty, is the prime cause of ethnic violence because these elites deliberately provoke violence as a means to maintain their hold on society and dubiously mislead their supporters and sympathisers into believing that the other side is to be blamed for the violence. Hence, elite predation coupled with mass uncertainty creates violence.
An equally powerful and contending theory to explain violence of this nature is the socio-psychologically propelled theory of symbolic politics put forward by Stuart J. Kaufman. According to this theory, the critical causes of ethnic or inter-tribal or clan violence are “group myths that justify hostility, fears of group extinction, and a symbolic politics of chauvinistic mobilisation.” Hostile socio-cultural myths about the “other” and exclusivist historical narratives can produce emotion-laden symbols, resulting in group hostility and “other” driven violence.
Significantly, as identified by Anthony Smith, each group has a “myth-symbol complex,” which creates subjective narratives binding a group vis-À-vis others.
Incidentally, elite manipulation of the social base for violent assertion is rather limited if such subjective discourses do not exist in a given society prior to violence. This theory posits that emotions, and not rational calculations, motivate people’s actions.
Indeed, the most important finding of the symbolic politics theory is worth mulling over if one wants to derive a specific explanation for ethnic conflicts in general and the Naga inter-group violence in particular. And that is: the sources of ethnic conflict are ultimately a struggle for relative group worth.
If one studies the present Naga inter-factional violence from the notion of a “security dilemma,” there is a situation of uncertainty existing in the Naga areas relating to both the intentions of the rival insurgent groups and their social base. In interviews with the author in July 2007 and January 2008, leaders of the NSCN(I-M), including self-styled Brigadier Phunthing Shimrang, said that though the outfit respected the ceasefire declaration by the JWGBDB, it was impossible to abide by it as they were uncertain about the intentions of their rival faction, the NSCN(K). NSCN(K) leader Khole Konyak offered the same argument about the NSCN(I-M)’s intentions.
A situation of uncertainly also prevails amongst the social base of the NSCN(I-M) around Diphupar in Nagaland, Ukhrul and Tamenglong in Manipur, and the NSCN(K) strongholds in Phek and Mon. Both staged violent ambushes in each other’s territory in order to pre-empt or prevent violent surprises by either.
However, when one views the Naga conflict from the elite predatory model, there is reason to believe that the NSCN(I-M) leaders have upped the ante in recent months following its split in November 2007, in order to demonstrate to its target population who is in charge. Also, the newly formed NSCN(U) is trying to establish itself in NSCN(I-M) territory, mainly in and around Dimapur. Therefore, it makes sense for the latter to step up attacks against both NSCN(U) cadres and civilians, to instil fear in the population and its support base. This will automatically rally the population towards the NSCN(I-M) as the only force capable of controlling violence. It also develops a pathetic path dependency: if the population does not support the outfit, they might face coercion of the worse kind — sometimes even death.
This happened on May 2 and 3 when three NSCN(U) cadres and a civilian were killed in Dimapur by NSCN(I-M) cadres in a show of power. Interestingly, Mr. Muivah and Mr. Swu argue that the NSCN(I-M) has been forced to use force due to the irrational and violent behaviour of its rival factions, effectively creating mass uncertainty about the causes of the violence.
The third explanation based on the symbolic politics theory is revealing. Naga social mores and history indicate that individual tribes have been rather exclusivist in their behaviour in the pre-colonial and colonial times, and this continues after Independence. Each tribe, Ao, Angami, Konyak, Maram, Sema, Tangkhul, and so on, lives in areas marked by single-tribe domination and little inter-mixing. This exclusivist social behaviour was, or is, informed by fears of group extinction and hostile myths, leading to more or less unfavourable attitudes to tribes that are not one’s own. In this context, it was, or is, rather easy for predatory insurgent elites to utilise emotional and symbolic hostile narratives to mobilise social support for violence. “Others” in individual Naga tribal historical narratives include not only other tribes but the larger Indian society, frequently viewed as posing a threat to their individual existence, resources, and identity. Therefore, though there is an existing cohesive Naga narrative across tribes against Indian subjugation, this unity no longer holds when tribes start fighting against one another.
Depending on the three explanations of growing ethnic tensions and violence, a resolution to the conflict has to be informed by three propositions. First, if the Naga conflict is based on the notion of a “security dilemma,” the state forces must negotiate between outfits, not only to remove the information and commitment problems but to broker a peace deal. This will resolve the “uncertainty” issue. If the cause of violence is elite predation, then the leadership structure of that particular society as well as of the insurgent outfits must be brought to heel. Since both outfits have a ceasefire arrangement with the Union government, state negotiators must firmly assert to the outfits’ leadership their aversion to social violence. This is the least the state forces can do for a ravaged Naga society in these circumstances.
If the violence is based on symbolic politics, then the problem is rather rooted and requires an alternative discourse aimed at deconstructing social Naga myths and hostile attitudes. Indeed, all three theories offer genuinely important explanations for the ongoing Naga inter-group conflict. A resolution mechanism must factor in a simultaneous process based on all the three factors — the security dilemma, elite predation and symbolic politics — if the violence is to be realistically ended.
(Dr. Namrata Goswami is an Associate Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi.)
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